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## ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

Mastery Monographs From a Trench-  
ant Pen.

## REBEL FAILURES.

Gen. Stephen D. Lee Takes  
Hood's Former Corps and  
Faces an Old Comrade.

## WONDERFUL DEFENSE.

First Battle in Howard's Com-  
mand of the Army of  
the Tennessee.

By

O. O. Howard  
Major-General.

## XVIII.—EZRA CHURCH.—(Continued).

LEUT.-GEN. Stephen D. Lee, who had been a classmate of mine at West Point and a comrade in the Spring of 1857 in a Florida campaign, was assigned by the Richmond Government to command the army corps which had been led by Hood before his promotion. Lee's assumption of his command was of the same date as mine; that is, the 27th of July, 1864. Hood, as soon as he divined Sherman's design of threatening his line of supply from the left instead of the right (east of Atlanta), as heretofore, meditated a plan of resistance similar to that in his last battle. Instructing Hardee with his corps and the Georgia militia to hold the Atlanta works, he ordered Lee to move out his three divisions to the Lick Skillet road, where, near Ezra Church, he would find Col. Jackson's cavalry. Lee was first to drive back our forces, just reported to be in possession of points on that road.

He also instructed Stewart to proceed with two divisions (Walthall's and Loring's) of his corps to follow up Lee and mass his troops near the place in the works where the Lick Skillet road left the city. Stewart, with a clear road, was to be there the morning of the 29th, to pass beyond Lee.

GAIN GROUND, AND ATTACK, as far as possible, beyond my right flank. Probably the movement of Stewart, followed up by his remaining division (French's), had all gone well with Lee, would have been made in the night of the 28th. The roads were favorable to this grand flank movement.

Lieut.-Gen. Lee, always prompt and energetic, proceeded at once, for there was no time to lose, if he wished to catch us in motion, to carry out the clear instructions of his chief. He appears to have moved out by the Bell's Ferry road. When near the Poorhouse he saw that some portion of the Yankee force was not far north of the Lick Skillet road, and that their outposts already had that road in possession. After a brief personal reconnaissance he sent off Jackson's cavalry to watch our Morgan's Division and my right, if perchance he could find that flank.

Brown's Division was in advance, and he formed his lines on the left of the Bell's Ferry road, facing substantially north. Brown had three brigades, reckoning from the road in order named—Johnston's, Sharp's and Brentley's, with Manigault in reserve in the rear.

Clayton's Division had come up after Brown's, and turned off to the right and formed with his left flank at the road, stretching out eastward with two brigades, Gibson's and Holtzclaw's. The latter extended his skirmishers farther off to the right until they connected with the Atlanta works. This line was supported by Baker's Brigade in reserve. The length of the whole line, five deployed brigades, was certainly as great as that of Logan's two divisions on the crest of the wooded ridge over there in their front, but not yet in sight.

Lee on the spot ordered Brown to "attack and drive the enemy" (Logan's outposts and skirmishers) "to Ezra Church, and hold that position." Brown instantly gave the order, and his lines moved forward. He

encountered first our skirmishers, and a little beyond their supporting reserves. These he drove rapidly, as he says, back for some distance "behind intrenchments."

Brown's account is a little confused after that. He avers that it was difficult to tell where those intrenchments were, on account of the density of the forest. He means by "intrenchments" our small piles of rails and logs. He is of the opinion that many points of Logan's works were carried at the first onslaught, but that by rapid reinforcement we recovered those points, and then he remarks that under this im-

mensely superior force "my troops were driven with great slaughter from them." Brown's combat was evidently a hard one. His right brigade commander, Johnston, was disabled by wounds. Johnston's successor (Coltart) was soon after wounded, and Col. Hart had hardly taken his place when he was struck, and a Lieutenant-Colonel (Toulmin) took the remnants of the brigade. Brown rushed forward his reserve brigade to replace that one, but found the behavior of his men too bad for remedy. His words are extraordinary:

"Its demoralization was so great it could not be made effective." His left brigade (Brantley's) was outflanked and compelled to retire. Brown now rallied his division, and formed the lines on a favoring ridge. He charged again, with the same disastrous results. Brown then waited near the Lick Skillet road for

federate shouts, so strong and confident, reached our ears, every man along the exposed front was warned to be ready. Those on the front line carefully knelt behind their slight defenses, or lay prone upon the ground with rifle in hand, gazing steadily through the forest toward the ominous sound.

Field and company officers gave a warning note: "Take steady aim, and fire low at the world!" After a few minutes of waiting the men on the ridge caught glimpses of the approaching Confederates tramping steadily and rapidly through the underbrush.

Next, without any record of orders given, the fire-at-will began. At the first, only two or three heavy guns took any part, so that the roar came increasing and diminishing from rapid rifle firing. The Confederates used some cannon; limbs of trees were broken and

The two regiments brought by Col. Strong were armed with breech-loading rifles. The Confederates at that point had kept bravely on. Some were tramping the rail piles; a few had passed them when those repeating arms began their work. The Confederate soldiers fell there; but few escaped death or wounds. Our artillery near my Headquarters, which could sweep a quarter of a circle, was actively engaged at this time in clearing the ground beyond those reinforcements.

Knowing Gen. Sherman's desire for Morgan's Division to come in on my right, something as Blucher did on Wellington's left at Waterloo, I sent, in the middle of the afternoon, to Gen. Sherman word about the situation.

Furthermore, as the contest was prolonged, and I had Dodge and Blair tied up by the Atlanta works, which occupied

an excellent effect on his command. After the firing had ceased he walked the line, and the men gathered about him in the most affectionate manner, and he at once gained their hearts and confidence. I deemed this a perfect restoration to confidence in themselves and the leader of that army."

It was my intention when I began this monograph to give more in detail the work of the divisions of Morgan L. Smith, Harrow, and Charles R. Woods, including their several most worthy brigade commanders; to show this work in something the same way as I did in the battle of Atlanta; but I now find that that will cause too much extension. The Confederate accounts themselves magnify the foresight, courage, and persistency of those division commanders.

(To be continued.)

## NOONDAY CHURCH.

Relative to the Part Taken at Command of Gen. Leggett by Battery B, 1st Mich. Art.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: In the matter of the cavalry battle known as Noonday Church, or Noonday Creek, near Kennesaw Mountain, Ga., June 20, 1864, Gen. Howard, in his monograph of Jan. 10, casually states the part borne by the conflict by some of the artillery of the Seventeenth Corps, then occupying the left of the line investing the rebel works on and about the Kennesaw. To this statement of Gen. Howard exceptions are taken by the commander of the Federal cavalry in a long article, Jan. 31, who vehemently asserts to the contrary, and which only goes to show how easy it is to be mistaken.

The writer of this article, with the utmost respect and consideration for the authors of the conflicting statements, begs to mention the following facts that occur to him: From April 1, 1864, until the close of the Atlanta campaign, the writer was Captain and commander of the 8th Mich. battery, and served with the same in the field. This battery was attached to and was a part of the Third Division (Leggett's), Seventeenth Corps (Blair's), and coming direct from the Big Black expedition in the Spring of 1864, reached the army under Gen. Sherman on June 8, and from thenceforward until the capture of Atlanta participated daily in the active operations of the campaign.

From about the 13th of June until after the assault on Kennesaw, the Seventeenth Corps was on the left of the Federal line of investment, and Leggett's Division (the Third) was the extreme left of the corps. This disposition brought us (the Third Division) next to the cavalry, who were as usual working for the close of the day.

Early on the morning of the 20th of June, the writer received verbal orders from the Division Chief of Artillery to be in readiness to accompany the brigade of Gen. Force on a reconnaissance or flanking movement to the left; and in conformity thereto the battery moved out in connection with the brigade about 1 o'clock p. m., taking a north-easterly course, seemingly parallel with the enemy's line and a sort of prolongation of our own.

The command moved some four or five miles with forward skirmishing in front and flank, until my battery and a portion of the infantry were halted on an eminence commanding considerable scope of country, and we were witnesses to considerable of an engagement between a portion of our infantry brigade and the Confederate line to the right of our line of march.

I was soon ordered into action and vigorously shelled the enemy back into their lines, after which we limbered up and moved in column back up the hill, awaiting orders. Soon after our attention was attracted by lively firing away to our left, and soon successive lines of our cavalry were developed apparently in close action with the enemy, and we could readily distinguish the cheers of the combatants, as well as their rattling volleys; but to my immediate vision from the position occupied we could only estimate the position of most of the troops engaged, and particularly that of the Confederates, who were beyond and among heavy timber, although to some of the officers of our command they were in sight.

Gen. Leggett in person at this time was on the field and an interested spectator, and at his suggestion we promptly went into battery action front and commenced throwing shell over and into the timber which concealed the rebels from our view. We fired from full battery single shots from right to left successively, with an interval of perhaps three seconds, and with the regularity of the tolling of a bell; fired five shells out to about 1,500 yards, and we could distinguish their explosions with equal regularity until we received orders to cease firing. I was advised then by some of our officers that occupied position overlooking the enemy that our shells did execution, and have in conversation with some of the cavalry that day engaged, learned that our endeavors to "hit a head where we could see it" was appreciated.

From this circumstance, without doubt, comes the information that Gen. Howard writes. It is impossible to get the reports of Gen. Leggett and Force of that day's transaction would mention the occurrence.

As the Federal cavalry commander writes, "Leggett's Division was several miles to my right," but that brigade under Force had covered five miles of that distance, evidently unknown to Gen. Minty at the time, and were within striking distance for some little time.

## HE VOLUNTEERED.

Then Crossed the Chattahoochee in a Pontoon.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: In a recent issue, in one of O. O. Howard's accounts of movements during the Atlanta Campaign, I noticed where and how Schofield crossed the Chattahoochee, and I remembered that I belonged to Schofield's command, and participated in that crossing; in fact, was an early crosser, and all owing to my foot habit of volunteering, which always got me into places that I wished I wasn't in.

On the morning of July 9, 1864, we had been advancing slowly until about 10 a. m., when we halted in the woods, alongside an old road, and remained standing in line of battle, not knowing what might be ahead of us in the woods. Our Lieutenant-Colonel

"This was my first battle after taking command of the Army of the Tennessee, and I was delighted with the conduct of officers and men. Maj.-Gen. Logan was spirited and energetic, going at once to the point where he apprehended the slightest danger of the enemy's success. His decision and resolution animated and encouraged his officers and men to hold on at all hazards. He says: 'Brig.-Gens. Woods, M. L. Smith, and Harrow, division commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the many and desperate assaults of the enemy. My losses were 60 killed, 439 wounded, 73 missing; aggregate, 562.'"

The number of Confederate slain left in our front was greater than our entire loss—642, as at first reported. We captured five battle-flags, 1,500 muskets, and many prisoners. After that battle of Ezra Church Hood confined himself to the defensive as long as we were in the neighborhood of Atlanta.

That evening my ambition stimulated me to put in fresh troops in order to sweep the field and make a bold and strong effort to capture Atlanta; but Logan's men were very tired. Blair's and Dodge's men had been on the qui vive all day within the reach of the enemy's cannonade, constantly kept up, and Morgan's Division had not succeeded in driving back Confederate Jackson's cavalry; therefore, my cooler judgment said let well enough alone.

After I had gone along the front lines and said what I could in appreciation of the wonderful defense made by our gallant soldiers, I simply ordered Logan to double his skirmishers and press them beyond us as far as practicable, and then give to the commands rest and quiet for the night.

Under cover of the darkness Lee withdrew from my front, after giving us a slight show of life through the firing of his artillery and infantry rear-guard. Then he hastened within the protection of the strong forts of Atlanta.


The letter which I wrote that day from the field of battle was as follows: Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL: The corps of Hood attacked us to-day at 11:30 a. m. on the right of my line, mainly opposite the Fifteenth Corps, with lines extending beyond my right flank. The assaults were pertinaciously kept up for four hours, with scarcely any intermission, and were invariably repulsed. The enemy's dead lie thickly on our front. We took several stands of colors and quite a number of prisoners. Gen. Logan bore the brunt of the battle, and his command acquitted itself nobly. Gen. Blair and Dodge weakened their lines to the lowest limits in order to extend his flank and reinforce him at any point. Our casualties are small, owing to the fact that we had just covered ourselves with tough barbed wire. Some of Polk's (Stewart's) command was engaged in the last assault. I will make a more specific report as soon as I can get the requisite returns from the different commands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
O. O. HOWARD, Major-General.

There is one letter that I find in the public records which I have never seen till now. I shall prize it as I do the "thanks of Congress." It is from Sherman, addressed to Schofield the evening of that memorable day. It reads:

"Gen. Howard's conduct to-day had



ATLANTA AND VICINITY.

Walthall's Division; for Stewart's Corps, upon news of Brown's failure, not waiting for the great flank movement, had hastened to the field to reinforce Lee's command, so hotly engaged.

As soon as relieved, Brown's Division passed to the right and rear of Clayton, for his support. Examining Clayton's work we find that he claimed even less results than Brown. Gibson's Brigades being ordered forward before he was ready, by one of Lee's staff officers, "soon struck the enemy, whose skirmishers, with the line supporting them, were promptly driven back on the main line." Holtzclaw's Brigade hastened up on Gibson's right. Just then Brown's troops had

## GONE BACK IN CONFUSION.

Clayton then brought forward his reserves, and pushed them in with his front line. His leading brigade ran against a salient in our works, and was very soon repulsed. As the troops came into action in succession, having the fight further to march, each brigade made its own attack. Clayton declares that the last two "fought with gallantry, and lost one-half of their original numbers." Clayton, like Brown, also reformed near the Lick Skillet road the shattered remnants of his command, and reported the facts to Lee.

Stewart brought forward his two divisions, Walthall's and Loring's, arriving after the action already described. He formed to the left of Lee, Walthall in advance. He organized two brigade fronts, Reynolds's on the right and Canby's on the left, keeping Quarles's Brigade in rear to watch his left flank. The protection of his right was trusted to Lee's command. He moved to the attack at 2 p. m. Speaking of us, his enemy, Walthall says: "I found him in strong position and large force on a hill a short distance in front, and failed to dislodge him after a vigorous and persistent effort, in which I lost 152 officers and nearly a thousand men—considerably over one-third my force. Quarles was then brought forward to repeat the operation. He made a bold and bloody assault, but his command was checked by the strong force in its front and the unopposed troops which lapped his flank and poured into it a damaging flank fire."

Walthall, an experienced soldier, introduces a remark which speaks for itself: "If it had been possible for the daring of officers and the

## DESPERATE FIGHTING

of the men to have overcome such numbers and strength of position as we encountered that day all along my whole line, the enemy must have been beaten; but double the force could not have accomplished what my division was ordered to undertake."

During this attack Lieut.-Gen. Stewart was wounded and Walthall replaced him. In their accounts, which, of course, were more from judgment than information, the Confederate officers exaggerated the numbers opposed to them. For example, Gen. Brown said at the time there were four corps against them, and Gen. Lee declared that there were two. The Confederates could hardly then have had prisoners from the eight regiments which were sent from other parts of my line to assist Logan's Corps.

The story of the battle is already nearly told. But to turn to our own points of view, when the fearful con-

fell; a few frightened men, as always, sprang away and ran toward the rear. There was more giving way on our extreme right.

Logan became greatly animated, and rushed first for all stragglers, and with drawn saber, and assisted by his officers, drove them back to their commands.

On the skirmish-line opposite our extreme right Maj. Chas. Hipp, with the 37th Ohio, aided by another regiment, had prepared

A LOG HOUSE FOR DEFENSE, and thrown out his skirmishers right and left. To the left of him, on lower ground, Col. W. S. Jones had two other regiments, with a section of artillery, in support of skirmishers and as an advance-guard.

The first warning to Maj. Hipp was heavy firing to his left. He was evidently beyond Brown's Division proper, westward, though not beyond the Confederate skirmish-line. Next, a shot penetrated his breast; still, he remained at his post. When they came near enough Hipp's regiments opened fire. Again he was shot, this time through the left arm, causing him to fall from his horse.

Serg't Torgler, who brought him off the field, received for it a medal of honor. The Adjutant, Lambert, acting for the Major, brought the regiment, fighting its way, without loss of order, all the way back to our main line. Col. Jones also succeeded in retiring his command to his proper front. It was doubtful such temporary covers as these outposts had had which caused Confederate Brown and others to think that they had driven back our men from a main line of works.

In my first report, concerning troops called by me from Dodge and Blair, I used these words:

"Four regiments were sent at once, but before their arrival the first shock had passed, the enemy being driven back at every point except perhaps on the extreme right, where there was scarcely more than a skirmish-line to resist him. As soon as possible Capt. Gilbreth, of my staff, led up two regiments to prolong the right." Two others, led by



EZRA CHURCH.

my Inspector-General, Strong, soon followed to the same point.

Early in the action, remembering some

REMARKABLE EXPERIENCES on other fields, I thought I would make assurance doubly sure. So I caused to be arranged ready for action 26 pieces of artillery, whose fire swept all the ground beyond Logan's right. Gen. Logan was mistaken in reporting that there was no artillery in use on our side, though but a few pieces were fired along his front, and the repulses one after another from the beginning of Brown's attack to the closing of Walthall's were made by riflemen mainly.

## FROM BRITAIN'S DOCKS.

Career of the Rebel Ram At-  
lanta.

## HER CONVERSION

High Hopes Entertained of Her  
Prowess.

## HER SURRENDER.

Weehawken and Nahant Cause  
a Distressing Blow to  
the Confederacy.

BY WM. SIMMONS, PHILADELPHIA, PA.


MONG THE Confederate naval authorities no event of the civil war produced such surprise and indignation as did the surrender of the ram Atlanta in Warsaw Sound, Ga., on June 12, 1863, by Capt. Wm. A. Webb, to the U. S. monitors Weehawken and Nahant.

The Atlanta was formerly the British steamer Fingal, built on the Clyde, and purchased for the Confederacy in September, 1861, by Capt. James D. Bulloch, who, during the war, was the purchasing agent for the Confederates in Europe. In the alterations of the vessel for the purpose of a ram a large sum of money had been expended, and consequently from it great results were expected.

The Fingal was a new steamer, capable of making at least 13 knots, and was remarkable on account of being the first steamer to run the blockade with supplies for the Confederate Government, and her cargo of military supplies was valuable enough to warrant her in taking the most perilous risks. In speaking of her, Capt. Bulloch, in the "Secret Service of the Confederacy," says:

"No single ship ever ran the blockade with a cargo composed so entirely of military and naval supplies, and the pressing need of them made it necessary to use every possible effort to get her into port."

On the 8th of October, 1861, the Fin-



CAPTURE OF THE ATLANTA.

gal sailed under British colors from Greenock, Scotland, calling at Holyhead, England, where Capt. Bulloch joined her. The vessel reached Bermuda Nov. 2, 1861, where she received a pilot for the Southern coast, but cleared port for Havana, Cuba. The crew, being British subjects, were called on the quarter deck, where Capt. Bulloch informed them that his intentions were to run the blockade, and offered to put into Nassau if any of them objected to continue with the ship. They unanimously consented to go on with the voyage.

## THE LITTLE BROWN BUTTON.

BY ELDER E. O. SHARPE.

Let the gay world of fashion with dash and with splendor,  
Each other's fancy to pen and to tongue,  
My thoughts turn in sweetness to our Nation's defender.

Who merits the grandest bravuras of song;  
The symbol of valor that clings to his attention  
Who banners and standards in festival float,  
Is the Little Brown Button with meek intervention,  
Which sets in its pride on the old soldier's coat.

The lackeys of fortune, the flunkies of princes,  
Are bravely arrayed in their glitter and gilt,  
With rows of bright buttons in brazen pretenses—  
Their pomp and their honor will suddenly wither;  
There are badges of credit for song and for story,  
Bestowed on some favorite whose name is of note,  
But the badge that is noblest and fullest of glory  
Is the Little Brown Button on the old soldier's coat.

Could it speak with the voice of God's trumpet angel,  
'Twould raise from the dead all the heroes that  
lived for the sake of our flag, free freedom's evangel,  
And cause them their various deeds to retell;  
If they sleep in the swamp, the field and on mountain,  
No more to the light of the bugle's bright note,  
But their whispers now mingle in memory's fountain,  
"Revere the Brown Button on the old soldier's coat."

By the rivers of blood that rushed in their career  
From the graves of the patriots who feed the soil,  
We never can cancel the debt that we owe;  
To the blue-coated private that slept by the road-  
side,  
Till washed by the rain of the enemy's guns,  
And back at them came with a death-dealing  
broadside,  
That saved the old flag to his dear little ones.

We declare now, by all that is holy and cherished,  
That this land which was purchased with ransom so dear,  
Must then have gone down and forever have perished—  
And shall we not grant them the drop of a tear?  
Ye pilgrims that followed with Grant or with Sherman,  
Your fame and your honor, your sons will pro-  
claim,  
And count as a lesson in life's noblest sermon  
The Little Brown Button you wear on your coat.

gal sailed under British colors from Greenock, Scotland, calling at Holyhead, England, where Capt. Bulloch joined her. The vessel reached Bermuda Nov. 2, 1861, where she received a pilot for the Southern coast, but cleared port for Havana, Cuba. The crew, being British subjects, were called on the quarter deck, where Capt. Bulloch informed them that his intentions were to run the blockade, and offered to put into Nassau if any of them objected to continue with the ship. They unanimously consented to go on with the voyage.

He then informed them that although the Fingal

he had her bill of sale in his pocket, and was empowered at any moment to take her in behalf of the Confederate Navy Department. Two guns were then hoisted out of her hold and mounted in the forward gangways. Howitzers were put into position on the quarter deck and small arms distributed to the crew.

Capt. Bulloch, watching a favorable opportunity, successfully ran the blockade and entered Savannah, Ga., on Nov. 12, 1861. As soon as the cargo was landed he reloaded with cotton on account of the Confederate Government, which he was ordered to take to Europe and dispose of to the best advantage, after which he was to turn the vessel over to Capt. G. F. Sinclair, C. S. N., who was to go over with him to England.

On Dec. 20 the Fingal attempted to go to sea, but found it impossible to do so, on account of the fact that the Union forces had occupied Tybee Island, thus enabling a more strict enforcement of the blockade of Savannah. Another attempt was made to escape to sea on Dec. 23, and still another about the middle of January. Finding escape impossible with the Fingal, Bulloch turned the command of the vessel over to Capt. Sinclair and went to Europe via Cape Fear route from Wilmington, N. C.

Available no longer as a cruiser or blockade runner, the Fingal was us-